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Current account imbalances have steadily increased in rich countries over the last 20 years.  While
the U.S. current account deficit dominates the numbers and the news, other countries, especially within
the Euro area, are also running large deficits. These deficits are different from the Latin American
deficits of the early 1980s, or the Mexican deficit of the early 1990s.  They involve rich countries;
they reflect mostly private saving and investment decisions, and fiscal deficits often play a marginal
role; and the deficits are financed mostly through equity, FDI, and own-currency bonds rather than
through bank lending. Yet, there appears a widely shared worry that these deficits are too large, and
government intervention is required.  My purpose, in this lecture, is to examine the logic of this argument.
I ask the following question:  Assume that deficits reflect private saving and investment decisions.
Assume also that people and firms have rational expectations.  Should the government intervene,
and, if so, how? To answer the question, I construct a simple benchmark.  In the benchmark, the outcome
is first best and there is no need nor justification for government intervention.  I then introduce simple
distortions in either goods, labor, or financial markets, and characterize the equilibrium in each case.
I derive optimal policy and the implications for the current account.  I show that optimal policy may
or may not lead to smaller current account deficits. I see the model and the extensions very much as
a first pass. Sharper conclusions require a better understanding of the exact nature and the extent of
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The last twenty years have been characterized by steadily larger current ac-
count imbalances in rich countries. This is shown in Figure 1, which shows the
evolution of the cross-country standard deviation of ratios of current account
balances to GDP, since 1988, for three sets of countries. The ¯rst line gives the
evolution of the standard deviation for the countries which are members of the
OECD today; this however is an unbalanced panel, and new members such as
Mexico or Central European countries are quite di®erent from earlier members.
For this reason, the second line gives the evolution of the standard deviation
for the countries that were already members of the OECD in 1988. The line is
very similar to the ¯rst: The increase is not driven by the addition of the new
members. The third line gives the evolution of the standard deviation for the
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Figure 1. Standard deviation of CA deficits/GDP
Source: OECD database.
Behind these trends are two major stories. The ¯rst is an increase in de¯cits
within the Euro area. Countries such as Portugal and Spain are running de¯cits
close to 10% of their GDP. The other is the increase in U.S. de¯cits, which now
stand at around 7% of GDP.
3From the Latin American de¯cits of the early 1980s to the Mexican de¯cit of
the mid 1990s, current account de¯cits have regularly made the news.1 Today's
current account de¯cits are however quite di®erent from their predecessors.
The countries in de¯cit are rich countries. The de¯cits are not primarily driven
by ¯scal de¯cits, but rather by private saving and investment decisions. The
de¯cits are typically ¯nanced through equity °ows, FDI °ows, and own-currency
government bonds, rather than through bank lending.
Thus, many of the concerns associated with, say, the Latin American de¯cits of
the 1980s, seem much less relevant here. Yet, policy makers and many econo-
mists worry that the de¯cits are too large. To caricature, there are roughly two
views:
The ¯rst is known as the \Lawson doctrine", named after Nigel Lawson, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer who articulated it in the 1980s. This \doctrine" is
basically a restatement of the ¯rst welfare theorem: To the extent that current
account de¯cits re°ect private saving and investment decisions, that there are
no distortions, and that expectations are rational, then there are no reasons for
the government to intervene.
The second|and more prevalent view|could be called the \prudential" or the
\IMF" view. It is that, even if de¯cits re°ected private saving and investment
decisions, distortions are present and lead to de¯cits that are too large. Govern-
ment intervention to reduce these de¯cits is desirable. This view is re°ected in
the frequent use of such terms as \global imbalances" and \fragility" to char-
acterize current evolutions. What exact distortions, and whether these indeed
justify policies aimed at reducing de¯cits, has not however been worked out.
The purpose of my lecture is to explore this issue. Moving away from particulars,
I take up a narrow question, namely: Assume that a current account de¯cit
re°ects private saving and investment decisions. Assume rational expectations.
Is there any reason for the government to intervene, and what is the optimal
form of that intervention?
It is clear that the answer depends on the existence and the speci¯c form of dis-
tortions present in the economy. Thus, I start from a benchmark in which such
distortions are absent, the equilibrium is the ¯rst-best outcome, and there is
no role for government intervention. I then introduce various distortions, which
1. For a review of both facts and discussions, see Edwards (2002).
4are often thought to be important in this context. In each case, I characterize
the e®ect of the distortion on the equilibrium, and discuss the role of policy.
Clearly the role of policy is to increase welfare, not reduce the de¯cit per se. As
we shall see, optimal policy may or may not imply a reduction in the de¯cit.
I see the model and its extensions very much as a ¯rst pass. Sharper conclusions
require a better understanding of the exact nature and the extent of distortions,
and we do not have it. Such understanding is needed however to improve the
quality of the current debate.
The lecture is organized as follows.
Section 1 looks at current account de¯cits within the Euro area, with a par-
ticular focus on Portugal, which is, in many ways, a poster child for the issues
raised in this lecture. Section 2 brie°y reviews the evidence on the U.S. current
account de¯cit, and on \global imbalances".
Section 3 develops the benchmark. My focus being on distortions, I develop the
simplest benchmark needed for the purposes, namely a two-period economy,
with tradables, non-tradables and leisure, log-log preferences and Cobb-Douglas
production. I focus on the e®ects of a shift in preferences, namely a decrease
in the discount factor. As is well understood, two mechanisms are at work:
intertemporal reallocation of consumption (and leisure) across periods, and in-
tratemporal reallocation of production between tradables and non-tradables.
Distortions may a®ect either or both mechanisms, and by implication, a®ect
current account de¯cits. Sections 4 to 6 look at the implications of di®erent
distortions.
The ¯rst-best equilibrium is associated with increases in the relative price of
non-tradables and in the wage in the ¯rst period, and corresponding decreases
in the second period. Section 4 looks at the implications of price or wage rigidi-
ties, and characterizes optimal policy. The optimal policy is to eliminate the
boom/slump in non-tradables generated by price or wage rigidities; this may or
may not imply a decrease in the current account de¯cit.
The ¯rst-best equilibrium is also associated with a decrease in the production
of tradables in the ¯rst period, and an increase in the production of tradables
in the second period. One may think of distortions which may make it di±cult
to recover and expand production in the second period. Financial constraints
may make it di±cult for ¯rms to survive in the ¯rst period, or to accumulate
5the funds needed for production in the second period. Section 5 looks at the
implications of such a distortion, and characterizes optimal policy. The purpose
of optimal policy in this case is clearly to limit the decrease in tradables pro-
duction in the ¯rst period. This may or may not imply a decrease the current
account de¯cit.
One of the current worries of policy makers, even in the United States, is the
possibility of a \sudden stop", a sharp increase in the rate of return required
by foreign investors. By itself and absent domestic distortions, the possibility of
a sudden stop does not change the ¯rst-best nature of the equilibrium: Private
agents will take this possibility into account when making plans. The question
is whether sudden stops can interact with distortions in a way that justi¯es
government intervention. Many potential mechanisms have been identi¯ed, but
most seem largely irrelevant in rich countries. Section 6 discusses these issues
by extending the benchmark to a three-period model. This allows us to look at
the e®ects of a positive probability of a sudden stop in the second period on
the equilibrium, and the potential role of policy in that context.
There is a long leap from these simple exercises to actual de¯cits. Section 7
nevertheless takes the leap, and draws tentative policy implications, both for
countries within the Euro, and for \global imbalances".
1 Current account de¯cits within the Euro area
Today, two member countries of the Euro area, Spain and Portugal, have current
account de¯cits close to 10% of GDP. In the context of this paper, the experience
of Portugal is particularly interesting, so let me start there.2
The basic macroeconomic evolutions are shown in Figure 2, which gives the
evolution of the unemployment rate, and of the ratio of the current account
de¯cit to GDP in Portugal, since 1995. The ¯gure points to two very di®erent
periods:
The ¯rst is an economic boom, from 1995 to 2000. There is general agreement
that the sources of the boom were twofold, both associated with the prospect
of joining the Euro. The ¯rst was a steady decrease in real interest rates, due
in large part to the disappearance of the currency premium. The second was
2. I have looked at it in more detail in Blanchard (2006a).
6the expectation that joining the Euro would accelerate convergence, and lead to
higher productivity growth. Both had the e®ect of increasing private spending,
leading both to higher output growth and to a steady increase in the current
account de¯cit. By 2000, the unemployment rate was below 4%, and the current
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Figure 2.  Unemployment rate and current account deficit
Note, as this goes to the theme of the lecture, that expectations may not have
been rational, but were surely not crazy. Note also that the boom was driven
by private spending, not public spending. From 1995 to 2000, the ratio of
the budget de¯cit to GDP decreased from 5% to 3%; the OECD measure of
the cyclically-adjusted de¯cit remained roughly constant. Note ¯nally that the
boom was associated with steady real appreciation: From 1995 to 2000, unit
labor costs increased by 12% relative to the Euro area average.
Expectations of faster convergence may have been reasonable. But they turned
out not to be borne out by the facts: Productivity growth has remained very
low, indeed lower than it was in the 1990s. Starting in 2001, private spend-
ing growth sharply decreased, leading to low growth and a steady increase in
unemployment. Attempts by the government to sustain growth have led to an
increase in ¯scal de¯cits, which are now around 5% of GDP. The unemployment
rate is back around 8%.
Despite the decrease in spending and the domestic slump, the current account
7de¯cit remains close to 10%. The main reason is the continuing appreciation of
Portuguese goods. Looking forward, return to higher growth and lower de¯cits
requires a real depreciation. Given that Portugal is a member of the Euro, any
such real depreciation must be achieved through lower nominal wage growth
relative to productivity growth|at least vis-µ a-vis its Euro partners. The prob-
lem Portugal faces here is shown in Figure 3, which gives the rate of growth
of wages (more precisely, compensation per employee in the business sector,
in euros) and the rate of growth of labor productivity (more precisely, labor
productivity per employee in the business sector) since 1996. Figure 3a gives
the absolute numbers for Portugal; Figure 3b gives the numbers for Portugal as
deviations from the corresponding numbers for the Euro area. Figure 3a shows
that, as one might expect, high unemployment has led to a decrease in nominal
wage growth; but this has come with a parallel decrease in labor productivity,
so the di®erence between the two has remained roughly constant. Figure 3b
shows that, indeed, Portuguese relative wage growth has continued to exceed
relative productivity growth. In other words, Portugal has continued to lose
competitiveness vis-µ a-vis its competitors in the Euro area. The relative depre-
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Figure 3. Wage and labor productivity growth
Source: OECD database.
8Should Portuguese macroeconomic policy have been di®erent in the second half
of the 1990s? Given what we now know, namely that expectations were too
optimistic, the answer is obviously yes. The relevant question is however what
should have been done given what was known then? Should government poli-
cies have reduced the boom, limited the appreciation, and limited the current
account de¯cit?
The question of what should have been done during the boom in Portugal is
now academic. But the question is very relevant for Spain today. Since the
mid-1990s, steady growth has led to a large decrease in the unemployment rate,
down from 20% to under 9% today|a decrease often referred to as the \Spanish
miracle." This growth has been sustained by growth in private spending rather
than public spending: The ¯scal position has turned from a large de¯cit in the
mid 1990s to a surplus of 1% of GDP today.
At the same time, growth has come with a steady real appreciation. Since 1995,
unit labor costs have increased by 21% relative to the Euro area. The current
account de¯cit has increased from rough balance in the mid 1990s to 9% of GDP
today. This raises a set of obvious questions. Will Spain go through the same
adjustment process as Portugal? Should government policies have been di®erent
over the last decade? Should they have limited output growth, appreciation, and
the current account de¯cit? What should the Spanish government do today?
2 The U.S. current account de¯cit
The U.S. current account de¯cit has dominated both the news and much of the
research in international macroeconomics in the recent past.3 My purpose here
is only to point to the aspects directly relevant to the theme of the lecture, the
role of private saving and investment versus ¯scal policy, the way the de¯cit
has been ¯nanced, and the rationality of expectations underlying decisions and
investors's choices:
The U.S. de¯cit is very large, and re°ected in current account surpluses vis-
µ a-vis the United States in most regions of the world. The composition of the
3. A good survey of theories and facts is provided by Cline (2005). An insightful analysis of
the relative roles of saving, investment, and porfolio °ows, in the United States and creditor
countries is given by Brender and Pisani (2007).
9corresponding current account surpluses for the third quarter of 2006 is given
in Table 1. Roughly half is accounted by Asia, primarily China and Japan.
Roughly one fourth is accounted for by Europe. Of the rest, an increasing but
still small proportion is accounted for by the Middle East, re°ecting the increase
in oil prices.
Table 1. The U.S. current account de¯cit and its counterparts. 2006-
3, in billions of dollars, at annual rates.
Total 902
of which
Europe 175 Asia 480
Canada 51 China 288
Latin America 120 Japan 108
Middle East 56
Source: BEA International Transactions. Table 11, January 2007
The U.S. de¯cit and the corresponding foreign surpluses have many causes.
I believe that there is now a broad consensus about the following proximate
causes. First, low U.S. saving, re°ecting primarily low private saving, but also
budget de¯cits. Second, high foreign saving, particularly from Asia|what Ben
Bernanke (2005) has referred to as the \saving glut." Third, low foreign invest-
ment, in both Europe and Asia. Fourth, a strong preference by investors for
U.S. over foreign assets. All four factors are needed to explain the combination
of current account balances, the strong dollar, low world real interest rates, and
apparently low expected returns on U.S. assets.4 The important point for my
purposes is that ¯scal policies, whether in the United States or abroad, while
not irrelevant, are clearly not the main cause of the U.S. current account de¯cit.
Private saving and investment decisions|sometimes mediated through policy,
such as the combination of capital controls on capital out°ows and reserve ac-
cumulation in China|around the world are.
Bank lending, which was central to the Latin American de¯cits, is nearly ir-
relevant in the case of the U.S. de¯cit. The composition of foreign holdings of
4. For more discussion, see in particular Bernanke (2005), Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa
(2005), and Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2006).
10¯nancial assets, for both stocks and °ows, is given in Table 2. The composition
of °ows has changed over time, but the picture given by the stock numbers is
very clear: In the third quarter of 2006, gross foreign holdings of U.S. assets
were roughly equal to 11 trillion dollars. Of those, roughly 40% took the form
of holdings of corporate equities and direct investment|a very di®erent picture
from the ¯nancing of Latin American de¯cits.





O±cial holdings 111 1,371
Private holdings -10 698
Corporate equities 112 2,601
Corporate bonds 377 2,596
Direct investment 185 2018
Source: Flow of Funds, Federal Reserve Board. Tables F.107, and L.107. Stocks:
\Total U.S. ¯nancial assets held by the rest of the world", as of 2006:3. Flows:
\Net acquisition of ¯nancial assets by the rest of the world", over the ¯rst three
quarters of 2006.
There has been much discussion as to whether investors behind these capital
°ows have rational expectations. There is no question that, sooner or later,
current account de¯cits will have to decrease, and this will most likely require
a substantial real depreciation of U.S. goods. For this reason, and given the low
U.S. interest rates, a number of economists have argued that foreign investors
were too optimistic about expected returns on U.S. assets. If investors have
a strong preference for U.S. assets however, and if they anticipate the rate
of depreciation to be positive but small, then the evidence against rational
expectations is much weaker. Indeed, over the past few years, ¯nancial investors
rather than these economists appear to have been right about the strength of
the dollar.
In short: Current \global imbalances" appear to come primarily from shifts
in private saving and investment. In the absence of strong evidence to the
11contrary, the assumption that expectations are rational does not appear un-
reasonable. This takes us back to the question raised in this lecture. Beyond
reducing the U.S. budget de¯cit|a reduction which indeed appears justi¯ed on
its own, but, by most estimates, would only make a dent in the current account
de¯cit|should the U.S. (and other) governments aim at reducing the remaining
imbalances further? Why, and if so, how?
3 A benchmark
For this and the next three sections, I shall focus on the following narrow
question: Assume current account de¯cits are the result of private saving and
investment decisions. Assume expectations are rational. Should the government
intervene, and if so how? To do so, I start with the following benchmark:
The model
The economy goes on|and people live for|two periods. In each period, people
derive utility from the consumption of two goods, tradables and non tradables,
and from leisure.5
Utility is given by:
maxV ´ U + ¯ U0
where









where primes denote second period variables, CT and CN denote the consump-
tion of tradables and non-tradables respectively, and L denotes leisure. ¯ is the
discount factor.
As is well known, the log-log assumptions, and the implication of equal in-
tratemporal and intertemporal elasticities of substitution eliminate a number
5. I introduce a labor-leisure choice because, when, later, I introduce distortions which imply
that employment is potentially o® the labor supply, I want to be able to assess the welfare
cost of such a deviation and derive the optimal policy.
12of interesting issues, in particular with respect to the path of tradables con-
sumption.6; but they are ¯ne for the points I want to make in this lecture.
Taking tradables as the numeraire, and assuming for simplicity that the world
interest rate, the interest rate in terms of tradables, is equal to zero, the budget
constraint of consumer-workers is given by:
qCN + CT + q0C0
N + C0
T = A ´ w(NT + NN) + w0(N0
T + N0
N) + ¼ + ¼0
with
NT + NN = ¹ L ¡ L; N0
T + N0
N = ¹ L ¡ L0
where A is total wealth, NT and NN denote employment in the tradables and
non-tradables sector respectively, q and w denote the relative price of non-
tradables and the wage in terms in tradables respectively. ¼ is pro¯t. For the
moment, there is no government; I shall introduce it later.
On the production side, competitive ¯rms in the tradables and non-tradables
sectors maximize pro¯t subject to the following production functions:
YT = Na
T; YN = Na
N
with similar equations holding for the second period. Capital is implicitly as-
sumed to be ¯xed, so there is no investment decision in the model. I shall focus
on current account de¯cits coming from variations in saving.
The equilibrium
Equilibrium requires that, in each period, the non-tradables and the labor mar-
ket clear. This gives us four equations:









































6. See for example Obstfeld and Rogo® (1996), 4-4, equation (34), and Dornbusch (1983).
13N0
T + N0















A = YT + Y 0
T + qYN + q0Y 0
N
The four equilibrium conditions are straightforward: Wealth is equal to the
present discounted value of output in terms of tradables. Spending on tradables,
on non-tradables, and on leisure are all proportional to wealth. The supply
of non-tradables|equivalently the demand for labor from the non-tradables
sector|is a decreasing function of the wage in terms of non-tradables; the
demand for labor from the tradables sector is a decreasing function of the real
wage in terms of tradables.
If ¯ = 1, (so the discount rate is equal to the world interest rate, namely zero),
then the equilibrium is the same in both periods and the current account is
balanced. It will be notationally convenient to assume that, in this equilibrium,
all quantities are equal to one, i.e. that Ci = Yi = Ni = L = C0
i = Y 0
i =
N0
i = L0 = 1, for i = T;N. This in turn requires that ¹ L = 3 and Á = a=2. For
our purposes, these restrictions are innocuous. Under this normalization also,
q = q0 = 1, and w = w0 = a. It is also convenient to introduce ~ w ´ w=a, so in
the initial equilibrium ~ w = ~ w0 = 1.
Increased impatience and current account de¯cits
I shall consider throughout the e®ects of an increase in impatience, d¯ < 0,
starting from ¯ = 1. Exactly the same analytical results would obtain|with a
minor di®erence which I shall point out below|if I looked instead at a decrease
in the rate of interest at which the country can borrow, dr < 0, starting from r =
0|an experiment which would capture for example part of what happened in
Portugal in the 1990s. Other shocks, for example the anticipation of increases in
productivity in either the production of tradables or non-tradables next period,
would lead to di®erent analytical results, but the same general conclusions about
distortions, and the role for policy.
The decrease in ¯ leads to two reallocations, intertemporal, and intratemporal:
² Being more impatient, people want to spend more and work less in the
¯rst period.
14² Consumption of non-tradables and tradables increase. The consumption
of tradables increases more than the consumption of non-tradables. Tak-










² Employment decreases (leisure increases). Employment in non-tradables
















² The price of non-tradables, q, increases. So does the tradables product










The real consumption wage, ~ w=
p
q increases.
² Increased demand for, and decreased supply of tradables lead to a current
account de¯cit:






² All changes hold with opposite signs in the second period.
² As a, the degree of returns to labor, increases, the production frontier
becomes less concave, and it becomes easier to shift production between
tradables and non-tradables. Thus, the price of non-tradables and the
wage increase by less. The production of non-tradables increases by more,
the production of tradables decreases by more, leading to a larger current
account de¯cit.
Thus, the equilibrium response exhibits an appreciation followed by a deprecia-
tion, and, correspondingly, a decrease in the production of tradables followed by
an increase later on. The current account de¯cit in the ¯rst period, due to both
higher consumption and lower production of tradables, is o®set by a current
account surplus in the second period.7
7. Under the alternative assumption of a decrease in the interest rate, dr < 0, all the equa-
tions above would hold, with dr replacing d¯. The only di®erence is that, while the decrease
15Clearly, under the assumptions made so far, the outcome is the ¯rst-best out-
come, and there is no need nor justi¯cation for government intervention. The
questions are then: What may be the relevant distortions in this context? How
do they a®ect the equilibrium? And what is the optimal policy? In the next
three sections, I explore three general directions: The potential role of wage
or price rigidities in distorting the adjustment; the potential role of ¯nancial
constraints in distorting adjustment in the tradables sector; the implications, if
any, of the possibility of sudden stops, in which the country is either cut from
world ¯nancial markets, or has to pay a much higher rate of return.
4 Wage and price rigidities, and current account de¯cits
During the 1990s, the increase in spending in Portugal came not only with
a current account de¯cit, but also an output boom and a large increase in
employment. This is in clear contrast to the outcome in our benchmark, where
the current account de¯cit comes with a decrease in employment.8
The result in the benchmark is more general than it may ¯rst appear: The same
would be true of an increase in expected productivity, leading to an increase
in wealth, and thus to an increase in both consumption and leisure in the ¯rst
period. This points to the potential role of wage and price rigidities in distorting
the adjustment: The price of non-tradables and the real wage may not have
increased enough to achieve the desired intratemporal reallocation between the
two sectors.
The slump since 2000 points to another type of potential wage and price rigidity.
In the ¯rst best, shifting from a current account de¯cit in the ¯rst period to a
current account surplus in the second requires a decrease in the relative price of
non-tradables and in the real wage. Such a real depreciation has proven di±cult
to achieve in Portugal. This points to something like downward wage rigidity.
There are many ways of formalizing wage and price distortions, and, in the end,
the details matter. In this section, I take a ¯rst pass by simply assuming that
both q and ~ w do not adjust at all, and thus remain equal to one throughout.
in ¯ has no e®ect on wealth A, the decrease in r increases wealth by dA = ¡2dr.
8. One of the many problems in mapping any model to the data: The initial unemployment
rate in Portugal (7% in 1995) was probably higher than the natural rate at the time. Thus,
some of the employment increase in the 1990s was probably justi¯ed.
16I assume that employment is determined by labor demand. That is, I assume
that, in the tradables sector, demand is determined by pro¯t maximization, and
that, in the non-tradables sector, labor demand is determined by the demand
for non-tradables.9 I leave the discussion of downward wage rigidity to later; it
turns out that its e®ects are quite di®erent from those in this section, and closely
related to the e®ects of ¯nancial constraints, discussed in the next section.
The equilibrium
In addition to the assumptions that q = q0 = 1 and ~ w = ~ w0 = 1, the equilibrium
is given by the condition that the non-tradables market clears each period:












A = 2 + YN + Y 0
N
Output of non-tradables is given by the demand for non-tradables, which is
proportional to wealth. Wealth is in turn equal to the sum of outputs in the
tradables and non-tradables sectors over the two periods. Given ~ w = ~ w0 = 1,
pro¯t maximization in the tradables sector implies constant production YT =
Y 0
T = 1.
Together, these two equations determine output of non-tradables in both pe-
riods, and thus total output, and wealth. Wealth in turn determines the con-
sumption of tradables in both periods, and by implication the current account
balance.
Increased impatience
Consider again an increase in impatience, a decrease in ¯. Given wage and price
9. The usual rationalization would be to assume monopolistic competitive price-setting ¯rms
in the non-tradable sector, willing to satisfy demand so long as price exceeds marginal cost.
An explicit formalization would then have an additional distortion, namely the presence of
the monopolistic markup. This distortion, so long as the markup is constant, is irrelevant for
my purposes.
17rigidities, only one mechanism is now at work, namely intertemporal realloca-
tion:
² People again want to spend more and work less in the current period.
² Consumption of non-tradables and tradables increase, and now increase










The increase in the consumption of tradables is the same as in the ¯rst
best. But, because the price of non-tradables does not increase, the in-
crease in the consumption on non-tradables is higher than in the ¯rst
best.
² Employment in non-tradables increases. Employment in tradables re-











² Increased demand for tradables, together with an unchanged supply, lead
to a current account de¯cit:




Because the increase in demand for tradables is the same as in the ¯rst
best, and supply does not decrease whereas it does in the ¯rst best, the
current account de¯cit is actually smaller than in the ¯rst best.10
² All changes hold with opposite signs in the second period.
Thus, the economy goes through a boom cum current account de¯cit in the
¯rst period, a slump cum current account surplus in the second period. Both
the boom and slump are ine±cient. Workers would rather work less than they
do in the ¯rst period, and more than they do in the second period.
A role for policy?
10. This result is not robust to more general preferences, and may not hold if the intertemporal
and intratemporal elasticities of substitution are di®erent. But the point that the current
account de¯cit need not be larger under such rigidities, is general.
18Can policy improve the outcome and, if so, how? A full answer would require a
full other lecture. Let me brie°y talk about monetary and tax policy, and then
deal more formally with the potential role of government spending.
Depending on the exact nature of rigidities, monetary policy can get the alloca-
tion close to or even back to ¯rst best. Take for example the case where wages
are °exible and only nominal non-tradable prices are rigid ( ~ w is °exible and q
is ¯xed in terms of domestic currency). Then, the appropriate nominal depreci-
ation can achieve the ¯rst-best q, and by implication, replicate the benchmark
allocation|eliminating both the boom and the slump, while allowing for a cur-
rent account de¯cit and intertemporal reallocation. In the presence of both wage
and price rigidities, monetary policy cannot in general simultaneously replicate
the ¯rst-best values of q and ~ w. But it can still improve the outcome.11
For the countries within the Euro such as Portugal, monetary policy is not
available however|at least with respect to country-speci¯c shocks. This shifts
the focus towards ¯scal policy. Here again, given the nature of the distortions, a
su±cient rich set of taxes, say taxes on non-tradables and on labor, can achieve
¯rst best. Let me however focus on the potential role of government spending.
Let's extend the benchmark to allow utility to depend on government spending,
according to:









Assume also that all government spending is ¯nanced through lump sum taxa-
tion. To maintain the simple property that, if ¯ = 1, all steady state productions
are equal to one, Á must now satisfy Á = (1 + ®)a=2; I make this assumption
in what follows.
Given the symmetry in treatment between private consumption and government
spending, it is clear that, in the absence of distortions, optimal ¯scal policy
would simply be given by:
Gi = ® Ci; i = T;N; G0
i = ® C0
i; i = T;N
11. This is well traveled ground in the research on optimal monetary policy in an open econ-
omy. See for example Devereux and Engel (2006).







I shall call this the \neutral" component of ¯scal policy, and focus on deviations
from this neutral component, denoted dgi;i = T;N and dg0
i;i = T;N for the
¯rst and second period respectively.
Now turn to the role of government spending in the case of price and wage
rigidities. Given the symmetry of ¯rst-period and second-period e®ects of the
decrease in ¯, it follows that the optimal policy satis¯es dg0
N = ¡dgN and
dg0
T = ¡dgT. Thus, we can focus on the determination of just dgN and dgT.
















An increase in government spending on non-tradables increases output of non-
tradables one-for-one. It has no e®ect on the consumption of non-tradables.
The reason why consumption is una®ected is the absence of a wealth e®ect:
Any increase in dgN is expected to be o®set by an equal decrease in dg0
N; any
increase in dYN induced by higher dgN is also expected to be o®set by an equal
decrease in dY 0
N:











An increase in government spending on tradables has an e®ect neither on pro-
duction nor on consumption of tradables. Thus, it a®ects the current account
de¯cit one-for-one. The reason why consumption is una®ected is again the ab-
sence of a wealth e®ect. Any increase in dgT is expected to be o®set by an equal
decrease in dg0
T.12
Thus, the right tool to reduce the ine±ciency is clearly dgN. A negative dgN
in the ¯rst period, associated with a positive dg0
N in the second period allows
the government to eliminate the boom and the slump. A negative dgT, followed
by a positive dg0
T would reduce the current account, but have no e®ect on the
ine±ciency. This suggests that the optimal policy is to use only dgN and dg0
N.
12. The extreme form of some of these results depends again on the log-log restrictions. But
the message about the relative e®ects of dgN and dgT is general.
20Indeed, under a quadratic approximation to the utility function and a linear
approximation to the equilibrium conditions, the optimal policy is given by:
dgN = ¡
®(1 + a)
2(® + a + a®)
(¡d¯) < 0
This policy leaves the current account de¯cit una®ected, but reduces the boom
and the slump.
The message from this ¯rst extension is that price and wage rigidities may well
distort the allocation. The optimal policy may not however be to reduce the
current account de¯cit. Indeed, in the simple case worked out here, the current
account de¯cit is una®ected. One question is whether more asymmetric forms
of rigidity, such as downward wage rigidity, would lead to di®erent conclusions.
The answer is yes, and I shall return to this below.
5 Financial constraints, and current account de¯cits
Adjustment in the ¯rst best implies ¯rst a decrease, then an increase (equal to
twice the initial decrease) in tradables output. One worry is that it may indeed
be di±cult for the tradables sector to expand after a long period of appreciation
and low production.
One may think of a number of reasons why this might be. Internal costs of
adjustment are not the issue: These will indeed a®ect the adjustment, and
thus a®ect in turn ¯rst-period decisions and the current account de¯cit; but,
absent other considerations, the outcome will still be the ¯rst-best outcome,
and there is no role for government policy. Other distortions may however be
relevant. Krugman (1987) emphasized for example external learning by doing,
and the fact that a long period of low production may lead to permanently
lower productivity. Others have emphasized ¯nancial constraints, the fact that
the tradables sector may not, after a long period of low pro¯ts, have the funds
needed to invest and increase production later on.
I explore this idea by making a simple, if highly reduced form, assumption. I
assume that production of tradables in the second period is given by:
Y 0







21Production of tradables is equal to the minimum of the pro¯t maximizing level
of output in the second period, and the level of production of tradables in the
¯rst period. For the shock we shall look at, namely an increase in impatience, the
constraint is binding, and second-period tradables output is thus constrained
to be no larger than ¯rst-period output.
Some generality would be obtained by allowing the parameter in front of ¯rst
period output to be di®erent from one; but this is inessential. A rough justi¯ca-
tion for this assumption may be the following: Tradables ¯rms can borrow up
to some multiple of ¯rst period earnings|which are proportional to output|to
pay the second-period wage bill, which is itself proportional to second-period
output. A more explicit and richer micro-grounding is given by Caballero and
Lorenzoni (2006): During the appreciation period, ¯rms incur losses. Because
of ¯nancial constraints, these losses may force them to decrease their capital
stock beyond what would be e±cient, putting constraints on the recovery in
the second period.
Another issue is whether ¯rms in the tradables sector internalize this constraint
when taking output decisions in the ¯rst period (and so choose a higher level
of production in the ¯rst period in order to relax the constraint on production
in the second period). This depends on whether the constraint holds at the
level of the ¯rm or for the tradables sector as a whole. I assume that the
constraint holds for the sector as a whole (that there is, for example, a segmented
¯nancial market where only tradables ¯rms can participate), and so ¯rms do
not internalize it in taking decisions in the ¯rst period.
The equilibrium
Equilibrium requires that the tradables market and the labor market each clear
in each period, yielding four equilibrium conditions. Let me introduce the gov-
ernment from the start, so as to prepare for the discussion of policy later on:
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Leaving aside the additional terms coming from the presence of ¯scal policy,
the only di®erence between these equations and those of the benchmark are in
the speci¯cation of the second-period demand for labor in the tradables sector
in the fourth equation: Assuming the constraint is binding, labor demand in
the second period is equal to labor demand in the ¯rst period, and so depends
on the ¯rst-period rather than the second-period real wage.
The way ¯scal policy enters is also straightforward. dgN and dg0
N directly a®ect
the demand for non-tradables, both directly and through their e®ect on wealth.
dgT and dg0
T a®ect spending and labor supply only to the extent that they a®ect
wealth. This is what is shown in the last equation.
Increased impatience
Consider now the e®ects of an increase in impatience, d¯ < 0, assuming ¯rst
that there is no ¯scal policy response, so all dg's are equal to zero. Then:
² Just as in the benchmark, people want to intertemporally substitute,
enjoy more consumption and more leisure in the ¯rst period. But they
now also take into account that lower tradables production in the ¯rst
period implies lower tradables production in the second period, and thus
lower income in the second period. This leads to a decrease in their
wealth, and thus lower consumption and higher labor supply in both
periods.
² Thus, the demand for tradables and non-tradables increases, but, in both
cases, by less than in the ¯rst best:
23dCN+dGN = dYN =
a
6
(¡d¯) > 0 dC0
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² Both because the increase in non-tradables output in the ¯rst period is
smaller than in the ¯rst best, and because the decrease in labor supply
is smaller than in the ¯rst best, the decrease in tradables output in the
¯rst period is also smaller than in the ¯rst best. As the ¯nancial market
constraint is binding, the decrease in tradables output in the second









² Higher demand and lower supply of tradables lead to a current account
de¯cit. The current account de¯cit is however smaller than in the ¯rst
best:




² Because the increase in the demand for non-tradables is smaller than in
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² In contrast to the ¯rst distortion, adjustments in the second period are
not mirror images of those in the ¯rst period. Output of tradables goes
down in both periods, output of non-tradables goes up. The current
account de¯cit comes with a slump in the tradables sector.
The misallocation of labor between the two sectors in the second period









Given this outcome, is there a role for ¯scal policy? Intuition suggests that
there is: A decrease in GN can decrease the demand and the production of
non-tradables, and thus increase the production of tradables in the ¯rst pe-
riod and, by implication, in the second period. Increases in either GT or G0
T,
while they have no direct e®ect on the production of tradables, decrease wealth
and thus private spending, including spending on non-tradables. This again in-
creases production of tradables in the ¯rst period, and by implication, in the
second period. This suggests that optimal policy includes decreases in GN, and
increases in GT and G0
T.
Figure 4. Optimal ¯scal policy
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−3 Optimal dgt prime
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This is indeed the case. Figure 4 gives the optimal values of the dgi's (the
deviation from neutral ¯scal policy) obtained by maximization of a second-
order approximation to the utility function subject to a linear approximation
of the equilibrium conditions given above. The ¯gure gives values for ® = 0:5
and a ranging from 0:5 to 0:9. It shows that, indeed, optimal dgN is negative,
optimal dg0
N is close to zero, and optimal dgT and dg0
T are equal to each other
and positive.
25Figure 5 shows the deviation of the current account de¯cit from its value absent
¯scal policy. Note that the current account de¯cit is actually larger under opti-
mal ¯scal policy (for example, 0.004 higher if a = 0:9). The reason is that while
the decrease in government spending on nontradables increases the production
of tradables, the optimal policy also requires an increase in government spend-
ing on tradables, which directly increases the current account de¯cit. I see this
result not as a major implication, but, again, as a warning that the presence of
distortions does not necessarily require policies aimed at reducing the current
account de¯cit.
Figure 5. Current account de¯cit, with and without ¯scal policy











−3 Deviation of current account deficit from no−policy outcome
a
The message from this second extension is that, to the extent that ¯nancial
constraints matter in the tradables sector, there is indeed a role for policy to
limit reallocation in the ¯rst period. The optimal policy however may or may
not decrease the current account de¯cit.
How important are the relevant ¯nancial market imperfections, and how much
do they limit reallocation?13 One might guess that tradables ¯rms in rich coun-
tries would be among those with the best access to ¯nancial markets, and thus
would be least likely to be ¯nancially constrained. But, as far as I can tell,
we do not know. Recent work by Calvo, Izquerdio, and Talvi (2006) suggests
that, even in Argentina after the collapse and the disorganization of credit mar-
13. The question has been explored, in a di®erent but related context, by Caballero and
Hammour (2005), who have looked at whether recessions lead to the disappearance of low
productivity versus ¯nancially constrained ¯rms.
26kets, tradables ¯rms have been able to increase production in response to the
(admittedly very large) peso depreciation.
Let me return brie°y to an issue I left aside in the previous section, namely
the implications of downward wage rigidity. Under the assumption that the
wage in terms of tradables can increase but cannot decrease, the equilibrium
looks very much like the equilibrium I have just characterized. In response to
an increase in impatience, downward rigidity prevents the ¯rst-best reallocation
of production: The real wage goes up in the ¯rst period, but cannot go down
in the second period, leading to lower production of both tradables and non-
tradables in the second period. Anticipations of lower future income, and thus
lower wealth (relative to ¯rst best), lead people to want to consume less and
work more in the ¯rst period (again, relative to ¯rst best). The result is a lower
current account de¯cit and boom in the ¯rst period, and an output slump cum
current account surplus in the second period.
Note that, under ¯nancial market constraints, the labor market clears in the sec-
ond period, but the allocation is distorted towards non-tradables; under down-
ward rigidity, the labor market does not clear, and both the production of
tradables and non-tradables are lower. In terms of policy however, the con-
clusions are roughly similar. Optimal policy requires measures which limit the
wage increase in the ¯rst period, either by decreasing demand for non-tradables
or the supply of labor.
6 Sudden stops, distortions, and policy
I suspect that, up to this point, I have not dealt with the main worry in the
mind of a number of economists and policy makers, namely \sudden stops." This
is the worry that a country may ¯nd itself suddenly cut from world ¯nancial
markets, or more realistically for a country such as the United States, that
foreign investors may ask suddenly for a much higher rate of return.14
That sudden stops can happen is amply demonstrated by history, most recently
by the Asian crisis.15 That they can lead to sharp depreciations, and sometimes
14. This is for example a recurring theme in Nouriel Roubini's blog commentary on the U.S.
current account de¯cit.
15. The Asian crisis indeed shows that sudden stops can happen even in the absence of large
current account de¯cits.
27to sharp drops in output, is also well documented. What is less clear is what
role they imply for policy vis-µ a-vis current account de¯cits.
Put simply, the possibility of sudden stops, i.e. the willingness|or lack of|
foreign investors to lend to the country, are not a distortion per se, but just
a statement about the borrowing opportunities open to the domestic econ-
omy. Under the assumption of rational expectations, borrowers will take this
possibility into account, and be more careful in their borrowing. Absent other
distortions, the outcome will still be the ¯rst-best outcome, implying no role
for policy. Put another way, the argument for policy must rely on the interac-
tion of sudden stops and speci¯c distortions|and in the context of this lecture,
distortions relevant for rich countries with well-developed ¯nancial markets.
Again, a treatment of the issues would require a full other paper. I shall limit
myself to a simple formalization of the arguments above, using it as a basis for
a more focused discussion.
It is obviously impossible to discuss sudden stops in our two-period model:
Repayment takes place in the second period in any case. Thus, the ¯rst step is
to extend the benchmark model to three periods, so:
V ´ U + ¯0U0 + ¯00U00
where U is de¯ned over tradables, non-tradables, and leisure in the same way
as before. Assume that initially, ¯0 = ¯00 = 1 and that the world interest rate is
equal to zero, so the equilibrium in each period is the same as in the benchmark.
We can now introduce the possibility of sudden stops by assuming that, in the
second period, the country is cut from world markets with some probability p.
It is clear that the possibility of sudden stops will a®ect borrowing decisions.
Take the extreme case where d¯0 = 0, and d¯00 < 0, and p = 1. In this case,
people want to shift consumption from the third to the ¯rst two periods, but
the world market is closed from the second period on. In this case, people will
not change their spending decisions, and the current account de¯cit in the ¯rst
period is equal to zero.
Increased impatience
Suppose that d¯0 = d¯00 < 0, so people want to shift utility from the second and
28third period to the ¯rst. And suppose that, in the second period, the country
is cut from world markets with probability p|and thus functions in autarchy
in the third period, or, with probability (1 ¡ p), can continue to borrow at the
world interest rate, r = 0. We can then solve for optimal consumption and labor
supply, and by implication for the current account de¯cit:
² The current account de¯cit in period 1 is given by:






The larger the probability of the sudden stop, the lower the initial in-
crease in consumption, the lower the initial decrease in production, and
the lower the initial current account de¯cit.
² Denote by q0
c the relative price of non-tradables in period 2 if a sudden














(¡d¯) < 0; dq00
c = 0
The lower the probability of a sudden stop, the larger the initial appreci-
ation, and so the larger the depreciation if a sudden stop actually takes
place.
A positive probability of a sudden stop, and of a large associated depreciation,
are clearly the reason why some economists worry about the current account
de¯cits. Are they right?
First, it is clear that, in the case of the United States today, ¯nancial markets
do not give a high probability to such an event. A positive probability of a
sudden stop should be re°ected in an upward sloping term structure|at least
relative to the \world term structure". In the model, de¯ning the short rate as
the interest rate in terms of tradables between period 1 and period 2, and the
long rate as the interest rate in terms of tradables between period 1 and period
3, the slope of the term structure is given by:




It is thus increasing in p. In contrast, one of the characteristics of the current
29U.S. term structure is that it is surprisingly °at (the so called \Greenspan
conundrum").
Second, and more generally, in the absence of other distortions, the equilibrium
we have just characterized is the ¯rst-best outcome, and there is no reason for
the government to intervene. It must therefore be that these economists are
worried about the interaction between the sharp depreciation and distortions.
From the Latin American and Asian experiences, we have learned that such
distortions may indeed be present. Financial imperfections may lead to a con-
traction rather than an expansion of the tradables sector in response to the
depreciation.16 The relevant question for this lecture is whether the factors that
played a central role in Latin America and Asia are relevant for rich countries,
in particular for the United States, where the current account de¯cit has been
¯nanced through direct investment, equity ¯nance, and own-currency bonds
rather than bank loans. The ¯rst pass answer must be that they are much less
relevant, if relevant at all.
Financial market imperfections, along the lines of those explored in the previous
section, may however be relevant. In response to a sharp and partly unexpected
depreciation, the tradables sector may face ¯nancial constraints and be limited
in its ability to increase output. This leads to a formalization which combines
sudden stops with ¯nancial market distortions. I see no reason to expect dra-
matically di®erent results from those obtained in the previous section. There is
now an argument for using policy, so as to limit the decline in tradables output
in the ¯rst period; it is still not clear however that the optimal policy implies a
reduction of current account de¯cits.
These are casual remarks, and it may well be that a stronger theoretical case for
de¯cit reduction can be made. The framework above provides perhaps a useful
starting point. I believe it is fair to say however that the case is less obvious,
on both theoretical and empirical grounds, than its proponents have made it
sound.
16. This is very well traveled ground. For a simple, but formal, discussion, see for example
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2002).
307 Back to the Euro area, and to global imbalances
This lecture has taken a step back from current policy debates and looked at
the case for policy intervention in the face of large current account de¯cits
in rich countries. It has made a few simple methodological points: The case
for intervention must rely on the presence of distortions. Which distortions,
and thus what intervention is required, must be spelled out explicitly. For the
distortions I have looked at, optimal policy typically did not involve current
account de¯cit reduction.
It is a large leap from the examples I have worked out to an assessment of
optimal policy vis-µ a-vis de¯cits within the Euro area, or vis-µ a-vis current \global
imbalances". The main purpose of my lecture was to stimulate research so as
to eventually get there. But it is too tempting not to try to jump now, and so
I shall not resist. The usual caveats apply.
Current account de¯cits in the Euro area
In the case of Euro-countries, the main distortions would appear to be wage
and price rigidities. These rigidities are clearly present, and together with the
¯xed exchange rate, a®ect the adjustment of real wages and relative prices.
These rigidities in turn imply a role for ¯scal policy, and for the use of govern-
ment spending. The speci¯c form of ¯scal policy depends on the speci¯c form
of rigidities, whether or not, for example, wage rigidities are symmetric. In the
current low in°ation environment, nominal wages may well be more downward
rigid. More work clearly needs to be done here, both on the exact nature of
the rigidities, and on their policy implications. But, as simple as it is, the an-
alytical exercise I have carried out points to two important issues, which are
insu±ciently discussed in the current European policy debate:
The ¯rst is the potentially important role of active ¯scal policy. It may well be
that the priority, for the time being, is to reduce budget de¯cits so as to recover
the margin of maneuver that ¯scal policy needs to operate optimally. But we
should think harder about to use this margin when it becomes available.
The second is that, while ¯scal policy can help, it is a poor instrument, and
the outcome may still be far away from ¯rst best. This strongly suggests that
governments should not take wage and price rigidities as given. Indeed, a better
31way of thinking about country-speci¯c macroeconomic policy in the context of
countries in a common currency area is to think of the joint use of wage and
¯scal policies.
This is not the usual call for lowering \labor market rigidities", or for more
\wage °exibility". It is a call for a better coordination of wage and ¯scal adjust-
ments. It is based on the hindsight that it would have been better for Portugal
to combine ¯scal contraction and wage increases in the 1990s, in exchange for
¯scal expansion and wage decreases in the 2000s.
How could this have been achieved in Portugal? Could it be achieved in Spain,
or in the next country to experience a country-speci¯c demand boom? Nobody
can be sure, but governments should try. I believe that, in the European context,
this requires a centralized information and bargaining structure, in which social
partners regularly discuss and potentially agree on the macroeconomic situation
and the measures to be taken. The presence of such a bargaining structure
surely is only a necessary condition: There may not have been agreement about
what needed to be done in Portugal in the 1990s, any more than there may
be agreement about what needs to be done today. But it surely increases the
chances of success. Such a structure is clearly more di±cult, if not impossible, to
put in place when the initial adjustment requires workers to accept a decrease
in wages|as is the case in Portugal today. This is why it has to be put in place
before the crises hit, and why I see it as a high priority in Euro area countries.
Absent such structures, the weight of the adjustment will fall on only one in-
strument, ¯scal policy. This instrument is limited in what it can do. And it
is likely to be misused. For the ¯rst half of the 2000s, Portugal tried to limit
its slump through a ¯scal expansion and an increase in ¯scal de¯cits, clearly
not the right instrument when the problem is with external demand. The same
danger looms in Spain, where policy makers talk about using a ¯scal expansion
if and when internal demand decreases. What will be needed then is a depre-
ciation and an increase in external demand. Using a ¯scal expansion will only
delay the required adjustment.
Global imbalances
In the case of global imbalances, the major countries involved are not con-
strained by exchange rate regimes (China is free to peg or not), so wage and
32price rigidities seem less relevant. It is also hard to think of ¯nancial imperfec-
tions which would prevent a large increase in US tradables output in response
to a depreciation. So, unless I have left out some central imperfections, the ¯rst-
pass answer must be that the case for government intervention, in the United
States or elsewhere, is weak.
This is however only a ¯rst-pass answer. The reason is that the shifts in private
saving and private investment which underlie current imbalances are themselves
due, in part, to distortions. For example, high saving in China re°ects in part
the lack of retirement and health insurance, and thus precautionary saving on
the part of Chinese individuals.17 Low investment in parts of Asia re°ects poor
¯nancial intermediation. Low saving in the United States re°ects in part public
dissaving; private saving itself maybe based on incorrect expectations about
retirement bene¯ts and health care.
Reducing these distortions, or in the last case, reducing the budget de¯cit, is
clearly desirable: China should provide better retirement and health insurance
to its citizens; this would increase their welfare. The United States government
should reduce its budget de¯cit, and so on. Such policy changes are indeed likely
to reduce imbalances: To the extent that providing insurance decreases saving
and increases internal demand, China may ¯nd that it has to reduce external
demand through an appreciation of the RMB, which will reduce China's current
account surplus. As it reduces its ¯scal de¯cit, the United States may ¯nd that
maintaining output at its natural level requires a decrease in interest rates and a
depreciation of the dollar, resulting in a reduction in its current account de¯cit.
But the purpose of these reforms should be the reduction of distortions, not the
reduction of current account de¯cits per se.
This raises a last question, and a central question for the IMF. Is there a
strong case for coordination of these changes and reforms across countries? I
think the answer is no, with however a caveat to which I return below. It is
basically in the interest of each country to implement such reforms, whether
or not the others embark on their own reforms. It is in the interest of China
to provide better insurance and health care to its citizens, whether or not the
United States reduces its budget de¯cit. It is in the interest of the United
States to reduce its budget de¯cit, whether or not Asia improves its ¯nancial
intermediation system. These adjustments will require adjustments in exchange
17. See for example Blanchard and Giavazzi (2006).
33rates and interest rates; but these can be achieved by domestic central banks
through monetary policy. The case for international coordination, at least on
economic grounds, seems weak. The caveat mentioned above is a methodogical
one, in line with the general argument of this lecture: The world we are looking
at is very much a second-best world, in which, at least in principle, the removal
of some distortions and not others could make things worse. I cannot think
of any realistic example in this context, but this is hardly proof that they do
not exist. Again, looking more closely at distortions, and working out their
implications, is needed to improve our understanding.
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